Picture yourself sitting down to play chess with a friend or negotiating the price of something at a local market. Whether you realize it or not, you’re engaging in what economists and mathematicians call a game-not in the recreational sense, but as a strategic situation where your success depends partly on the decisions others make. Understanding how these interactions work requires grasping the basic rules that define any strategic situation, and that’s where game theory begins.

Table of Contents

Who’s playing and what can they do?

Every game starts with a fundamental question: who are the participants? In game theory, we call these participants players, and identifying them is the first essential rule. These players might be individuals, companies competing in a marketplace, nations negotiating treaties, or even biological organisms competing for resources. The players in a game are the decision-makers whose choices influence the outcome for everyone involved.

Think about a simple business scenario: two ice cream vendors deciding where to set up their carts on a beach. Here, the two vendors are the players. But identifying players isn’t always this straightforward. Sometimes games involve many players, and occasionally even “nature” itself is considered a player when random events like weather or luck influence outcomes.

Once we know who’s playing, the next crucial element is understanding what each player can actually do. These possible choices are called actions or strategies. In our ice cream vendor example, each seller’s actions might include choosing any spot along the beach to set up shop. A strategy, more specifically, describes a complete plan of action that tells a player what to do at every possible point where they might need to make a decision.

In game theory terminology, a strategy is essentially a program instructing a player which action to take at every node where they could be called upon to make a choice. This distinction matters because in complex situations, players need to plan not just their first move, but how they’ll respond to every possible move by others.

When moves happen and what everyone gets

The sequence of play forms another critical rule that shapes how a game unfolds. Some games are simultaneous-imagine two businesses launching competing products on the same day without knowing the other’s exact plans. Other games are sequential-like chess, where you see your opponent’s move before deciding your own response.

This distinction profoundly affects strategic thinking. In simultaneous games, you must anticipate what others will do without seeing their actual choices. In sequential games, you can observe and react. Sequential games involve players making decisions at different times and potentially adjusting their strategies based on earlier actions, while simultaneous games require everyone to commit to their choices without knowing what others have selected.

Consider salary negotiations: if you’re asked to state your desired salary before knowing what the employer is willing to offer, that’s a simultaneous game element. But if negotiations proceed back and forth with offers and counter-offers, the sequential nature allows each party to adjust based on what they’ve learned.

Perhaps the most important rule in any game concerns payoffs-what each player gets at the end. Payoffs represent the rewards or outcomes that players receive depending on the combination of choices everyone makes. These aren’t always monetary; they could represent satisfaction, utility, competitive advantage, or evolutionary fitness. Payoffs are typically assigned using utility functions that rank how much each player values different outcomes.

The fascinating thing about payoffs is how they’re interconnected. Your payoff doesn’t just depend on what you do-it depends on what everyone else does too. That’s what makes these situations truly strategic and distinguishes them from simple individual decision-making. The ice cream vendor who chooses the perfect spot might still fail if their competitor picks a location that draws away all the customers.

The foundation of shared understanding

Here’s where game theory makes a somewhat surprising assumption that ties everything together: common knowledge. This principle states that all the rules we’ve discussed-who the players are, what actions they can take, the sequence of play, and the payoff structure-are known not just by everyone, but everyone knows that everyone knows, and everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows, and so on infinitely.

Common knowledge requires that all players know the rules of the game and each other’s utility functions, and furthermore, each player must be aware that all other players also possess this knowledge. This creates what philosophers call an infinite regress of mutual knowledge.

Why does this matter? Imagine playing poker if you weren’t sure whether your opponent understood the ranking of hands, or if they weren’t sure whether you understood it. The strategic calculations become impossible without this shared foundation. Common knowledge provides the bedrock upon which players can reason about what others will do.

The concept ensures that all participants operate from the same framework of understanding about the strategic situation, enabling them to predict and respond to each other’s behavior rationally. Without common knowledge, players might make decisions based on different understandings of the situation, leading to coordination failures or suboptimal outcomes.

Consider a coordination problem: two colleagues trying to meet for lunch without having discussed where. If it’s common knowledge that there’s a popular cafeteria where colleagues typically meet, both might independently go there and successfully coordinate. But if one person doesn’t know that this convention exists, or doesn’t know that others know it exists, coordination breaks down.

The assumption of common knowledge is admittedly idealized-real-world situations rarely provide such perfect transparency. Yet it serves as a useful baseline for analysis. When we relax this assumption, we enter the realm of games with incomplete or imperfect information, which introduce additional layers of complexity but build on these same foundational concepts.

What do you think? Can you identify a recent decision you made that depended heavily on anticipating what someone else would do? How might the outcome have changed if you’d had different information about the rules of that interaction or if the other person had different expectations about your choices?

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References
  1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory
  2. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/
  3. https://policonomics.com/lp-game-theory1-common-knowledge/
  4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_knowledge_(logic)

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Microeconomic Analysis

1 Theory of Consumer Behaviour- Basic Themes

  1. The Basic Themes
  2. Consumer Choice Concerning Utility
  3. Introduction to Demand Analysis
  4. Ordinal Theory: Indifference Curve Approach
  5. Concepts of Income and Substitution Effects
  6. Slutsky’s Theorem
  7. Compensated Demand Curve

2 Theory of Demand

  1. Preference and Utility
  2. Indifference Curve and Budget Set
  3. Utility Maximisation Problem (UMP)
  4. Expenditure Minimisation Problem (EMP)
  5. Decomposition of Price Effect
  6. Duality Relations

3 Theory of Demand- Some Recent Developments

  1. Recent Developments in Demand Analysis: Linear Expenditure Systems
  2. Theory of Consumer Surplus
  3. Theory of Inter-Temporal Consumption
  4. Elementary Theory of Price Formation: Demand-Supply Analysis
  5. Cobweb Model
  6. Lagged Adjustment in Interrelated Markets

4 Theory of Production

  1. Short Period Analysis
  2. Returns to a Factor
  3. Long Period Analysis
  4. Iso-quant
  5. Elasticity of Substitution
  6. Returns to Scale
  7. Homogeneous Production Function

5 Theory of Cost

  1. Concept of Short-Run and Long-Run
  2. Traditional Theory of Cost
  3. Economics of Scale
  4. Modern Theory of Cost

6 Production Economics

  1. Production Functions
  2. Technical Progress
  3. Cost Functions
  4. Profit Maximisation
  5. Cost Minimisation and Profit

7 Perfect Competition

  1. Perfect Competition
  2. Short-run Equilibrium of Firm
  3. Supply Curve of Firm and Industry
  4. Short-run Equilibrium of Industry
  5. Long-run Equilibrium of Firm and Industry

8 Monopoly

  1. Definition of a Monopoly
  2. Factors Behind Generation of Monopoly
  3. Demand and Revenue Functions of a Monopolist
  4. Cost Function in Monopoly
  5. Equilibrium of the Monopolist
  6. Price Discrimination
  7. Welfare Aspects of Monopoly
  8. Monopoly Control and Regulations
  9. Multi-plant Monopolist
  10. Bilateral Monopolist

9 ̆Monopolistic Competition

  1. Features of Monopolistic Competition
  2. General Approach to Equilibrium
  3. Chamberlain’s Approach to Equilibrium
  4. Selling Costs
  5. Excess Capacity under Monopolistic Competition
  6. Criticism of Monopolistic Competition

10 Oligopoly

  1. Oligopoly: Homogenous Product
  2. Oligopoly: Differential Products
  3. Oligopsony

11 General Equilibrium- Pure Exchange Model

  1. A Pure Exchange Economy
  2. Walrasian Equilibrium
  3. Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem
  4. Mechanism for Attaining Walrasian Equilibrium
  5. Competitive Equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency

12 General Equilibrium with Production

  1. Set Up of the Problem
  2. Edgeworth Box for Production
  3. Production Possibility Frontier (PPF)
  4. Consumption Optimisation
  5. Product-mix Efficiency and the Optimum
  6. General Equilibrium Price Setting and Efficiency
  7. Link between Factor and Goods Markets
  8. Link between Goods and Factor Prices

13 Pigovian vs Paretian Approach

  1. Pigovian Approach
  2. Pareto Optimal Conditions
  3. Two Fundamental Welfare Theorems

14 Social Welfare Function

  1. Value Judgment
  2. Social Welfare Function
  3. Compensation Principle
  4. Kaldor-Hicks Criteria
  5. Scitovsky Reversals and the Double Criteria
  6. William Gorman’s Intransitivity Problem
  7. Samuelson’s Criteria
  8. An Appraisal

15 Imperfect Market Externality and Public Goods

  1. Inability to Obtain Optimum Welfare
  2. Externality
  3. Public Goods and Market Failure

16 Social Choice and Welfare

  1. Theory of Second Best
  2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
  3. Rawls’ Theory of Justice
  4. Equity-Efficiency Trade-off

17 Choice in Uncertain Situations

  1. Behaviour Under Uncertainty: Some Observations
  2. Lotteries
  3. Expected Utility Theory
  4. vNM Expected Utility Theory
  5. Expected Utility Theory and Risk Aversion
  6. Risk Aversion and Insurance

18 Insurance Choice and Risk

  1. Reduction of Risk
  2. Problems in Insurance Markets
  3. Modelling Insurance Market with Adverse Selection

19 Economics of Information

  1. The Principal-Agent Framework
  2. Moral Hazard Problem
  3. Adverse Selection in Markets
  4. Hidden Information Modelling
  5. Efficiency Wage Model

20 Static Games of Complete Information

  1. Some Examples of Strategic Game
  2. Classifications of Games
  3. Rules of the Game
  4. Normal Form of Game under Complete Information
  5. Solution Concept under Dominant Strategy
  6. Solution Concept under Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategy
  7. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

21 Static Games with Complete Information- Applications

  1. Game Theoretic Applications in Common Property Resources
  2. Best Response Function
  3. Quantity Competition and Price Competition
  4. War of Attrition
  5. Hotelling’s Location Game

22 Dynamic Games with Complete Information

  1. Extensive-form Representation of Dynamic Games
  2. Strategies in Extensive-form
  3. Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information
  4. Backward Induction
  5. Strategies in Dynamic Games with Complete Information
  6. Subgames
  7. Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
  8. Application 1: Stackelberg Competition
  9. Application 2: Sequential Bargaining
  10. Dynamic Games of Imperfect Information
  11. Imperfect Information and Backward Induction
  12. Subgames with Imperfect Information
  13. Strategies with Imperfect Information
  14. Finding SPNE with Imperfect Information
  15. Repeated Games
  16. Two-Stage Repeated Games
  17. Finitely Repeated Games
  18. Infinitely Repeated Games
  19. Application 3: Collusion between Cournot Duopolists

23 Static Games of Incomplete Information (with Application to Auction)

  1. The Idea of Incomplete Information
  2. Beliefs
  3. Bayesian Games
  4. Application to Auctions

24 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information- Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

  1. Problem with SPE
  2. Requirements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
  3. Beliefs
  4. Sequential Rationality
  5. Assessment and Perfect Equilibrium
  6. Weak Sequential Equilibrium
  7. Consistent Assessment Off-the-Path Equilibrium

25 Signaling Games and their Application

  1. Modeling Signaling Games
  2. A Second Approach to Equilibrium Analysis: Pooling and Separating Equilibria
  3. Application: Job Market Signaling

26 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

  1. Sequential Equilibrium is not Stringent Enough
  2. Signaling Games
  3. The Intuitive Criterion
  4. The Intuitive Criterion with Two Types of Agents and only Two Responses
  5. The Divinity Criterion
  6. Spence’s Labour Market Signaling Game
  7. When Do We Need to Apply the D1-Criterion?